The demand and supply of participation: Social psychological correlates of participation in social movements

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Participation in social movements is a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, there are many different forms of movement participation. Two important dimensions to distinguish forms of participation are time and effort. Some forms of participation are limited in time or of a once-only kind and involve little effort or risk—giving money, signing a petition, or taking part in a peaceful demonstration. Examples in the literature are the demonstration and petition against cruise missiles in the Netherlands (Klandermans and Oegema 1987, Oegema and Klandermans 1994). Other forms of participation, are also short-lived but involve considerable effort or risk—a sit-in, a site occupation or a strike. Participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer (McAdam 1988) and participation in the Sanctuary movement (Nepstadt and Smith 1999) are cases in point. Participation can also be indefinite but little demanding—paying a membership fee to an organization or being on call for two nights a month. Pichardo et al (1998) studied a variety of such forms of participation in the environmental movement. Finally, there are forms of participation that are both enduring and taxing like being a member on a committee or a volunteer in a movement organization. Examples are the members of neighborhood committees (Oliver 1984) and the members of underground organizations (Della Porta 1988, 1992). From a social psychological viewpoint taxonomies of participation are relevant because one may expect different forms of participation to involve different motivational dynamics. This is indeed what Passy (2001) found in one of the rare comparative studies of types of movement participation.

In this chapter I will try to develop a social psychology of movement participation that takes these intricacies into account. In doing so I borrow the ‘demand and supply’ metaphor from economics. Demand refers to the potential in a society for protest; supply refers, on the other hand, to the opportunities staged by organizers to protest. Mobilization brings a demand for political protest that exists in a society together with a supply of opportunities to take part in such protest. The demand-side of participation requires studies of such phenomena as socialization, grievance formation, causal attribution and the formation of collective identity. The study of the supply-side of participation concerns such matters as action repertoires, the effectiveness of social movements, the frames and ideologies movements stand for, and the constituents of identification they offer. Mobilization is the process that links demand and supply. Mobilization is the marketing mechanism of the social movement domain, and thus, the study of mobilization concerns such matters as the effectiveness of (persuasive) communication, the influence of social networks, and the perceived costs and benefits of participation.

Studies of participation tend to concentrate on mobilization and to neglect the development of demand and supply factors. Yet, there is no reason to take either for granted. To be sure, grievances abound in a society, but that does not mean that there is no reason to explain how grievances develop and how they are transformed into a demand for protest. Nor does the presence of social movement organizations in a society mean that there is no need to understand their formation and to investigate how they stage opportunities to protest and how these opportunities are seized by aggrieved people.
The dynamics of movement participation

My treatment of the dynamics of movement participation builds on the assumption that we can distinguish three fundamental reasons why movement participation is appealing to people: people may want to change their circumstances, they may want to act as members of their group, or they may want to give meaning to their world and express their views and feelings. I suggest that together these three motives account for most of the demand for collective political action in a society. Social movements may supply the opportunity to fulfil these demands and the better they do, the more movement participation turns into a satisfying experience. In order to refer in brief to these three types of transactions of demand and supply I will use as shortcuts: instrumentality, identity and ideology. Instrumentality refers to movement participation as an attempt to influence the social and political environment; identity refers to movement participation as a manifestation of identification with a group; and ideology refers to movement participation as a search for meaning and an expression of one’s views. Different theories are associated with these three angles (see Tarrow 1998 and Klandermans 1997 for overviews). Instrumentality is related to resource mobilization and political process theories of social movements and at the psychological level to rational choice theory and expectancy-value theories; identity is related to sociological approaches that emphasize the collective identity component of social movement participation and with the social psychological social identity theory; and ideology is related to approaches in social movement literature that focus on culture, meaning, narratives, moral reasoning, and emotion and in psychology to theories of social cognition and emotions. I am not suggesting that these are mutually exclusive motives, or competing views on social movement participation, I do hold, however, that approaches that neglect any of those three motives are fundamentally flawed.

I know of no study which has attempted to assess the relative weight of all three motives in their effect on participation. Simon and his students (Simon et al.1998) have studied the relative influence of identity and instrumentality and shown that both instrumentality and identity play an independent role in the explanation of participation (see also Kelly and Breinlinger 1996; De Weerd 1999; and Stürmer 2001). In her study of farmer’s protest in the Netherlands (1999) de Weerd showed that feelings of injustice, identity and agency—the three dimension of the collective action frame—independently contributed to the explanation of why farmers participate in protest. But other than that, we are bound to speculation. Based on these studies I would at the very least propose an additive model. If all three motives apply participation is more likely than if only one or two apply. An additive model, of course, implies that the motives may compensate one another perhaps even to the extent that in an individual case one or two motives may be irrelevant altogether. To complicate matters further, the three motives may interact. For example, a strong identification or ideology might alter cost-benefit calculations. Similarly, a strong ideology may reinforce levels of identification. These are thorny issues and robust results from empirical studies are lacking.

The demand-side of collective political action

Marwell and Oliver (1993) once observed that in view of significant changes in their environment most people continue to do what they were doing, namely nothing. This observation suggests that the demand for collective political action in a society is usually low. On the other hand, it has been argued that collective political action has become more common over the last decades (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Klandermans 2001). In this section I
will further elaborate on the issue and discuss the demand side of instrumentality, identity and ideology.

**Instrumentality.** A demand for change begins with dissatisfaction, be it the experience of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, moral indignation about some state of affairs, or a suddenly imposed grievance (Klandermans 1997). Social psychological grievance theories such as relative deprivation theory, or social justice theory have tried to specify how and why grievances develop (see Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith and Huo 1997; Tyler and Smith 1998 for overviews). Despite the fact that grievances are at the roots of collective political action, they haven’t featured prominently in social movement literature since the early seventies. Resource mobilization theory and political process theory, the two approaches that have dominated the field in that period have always taken as their point of departure that grievances are ubiquitous and that the key-question in movement participation research is not so much why people are aggrieved, but why aggrieved people participate. However, a focus on the demand-side of participation will bring grievances back to centre stage (Neidhardt and Rucht 1993; Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier 2001b).

In the seventies, in reaction to approaches that tended to picture movement participation as irrational (Le Bon 1960; Hoffer 1951; Kornhauser 1959), social movement scholars began to emphasize the instrumental character of movement participation. No longer was it depicted as behavior out of resentment by marginalized and isolated individuals, or as aggressive reaction to frustration, or as politics of impatience, but as politics with other means. It were especially the resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1976, Oberschall 1973) and political process approaches (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982) that took the assumed rationality of movement participants as their point of departure. According to these authors, movement participation is as rational or irrational as any other behavior. Movement participants are people who belief that they can change their political environment to their advantage and the instrumentality paradigm holds that their behavior is controlled by the perceived costs and benefits of participation. It is taken for granted that they are aggrieved, but it are not so much the grievances per sé but the belief that the situation can be changed at affordable costs that make them participate. They have the resources and perceive the opportunities to make an impact.

From an instrumental perspective a solution must be found for the dilemma of collective action. Olson (1965) argued that rational actors will not contribute to the production of a collective good unless selective incentives persuade them to do so. Olson’s argument helped to explain why so often people do not participate in social movements despite the interest they have in the achievement of the movement’s goals. Movement scholars argued that movement goals typically are collective goods. If the goal is achieved people will enjoy the benefits irrespective of whether they have participated in the effort. In view of a goal for which achievement is uncertain, but for which benefits—if materialized—can be reaped anyway, rational actors will take a free ride, so the Olsonian reasoning. Selective incentives are supposedly the solution to the dilemma of collective action. Such incentives are typically supply-factors. Therefore, we will return to the issue when we discuss the supply-side of participation.

However, social movement scholars quickly discovered that reality is more complex than Olson’s reasoning suggested. The problem with Olson’s logic is that indeed it provides an explanation for why people do not participate, but fares poorly in explaining why people do participate. Moreover, Oliver (1980) argued that Olson’s solution that selective incentives make people participate is fundamentally flawed, as it does not give a satisfactory answer to the question where the resources needed to provide selective incentives come from. If these must be collected from individual citizens the same collective action dilemma arises again.
This is not to say that selective incentives are irrelevant, but that in the final instance they cannot solve the collective action dilemma. Kim and Bearman (1997) have argued that the failure of rational choice models to explain collective action roots in the assumption that interests are fixed. They develop a far more complex model that relaxed the assumptions of fixed interests and assumes that interactions shape interests. “Interests are sensitive to history,” they hold, “actors are interdependent, and activism is enhanced through increasing embeddedness in activist networks” (p. 72). They conclude that interest and embeddedness in dense activist network accounts for the occurrence of collective action. This relates to a recurring criticism that Olson’s model assumes that individuals make their decisions in isolation, as if there are no other people with whom they consult, with whom they feel solidarity, and by whom they are kept to their promises. This pointed to the significance of collective identity as a factor in movement participation.

Identity. Soon it became clear that instrumentality was not the only motive to participate. After all, much of the movement goals are only reached in the long run if at all. Similarly, when it comes to material benefits not seldom costs are outweighing benefits. Apparently, there is more in being a movement participant than perceived costs and benefits. Indeed, one of those motives relates to belonging to a valued group.

Simon (1998, 1999) succinctly described identity as a place in society. People occupy many different places in society. They are student, unemployed, housewife, soccer player, politician, farmer, and so on. Some of those places are exclusive, occupied only by a small number of people. The members of a soccer team are an example. Others are inclusive encompassing large numbers of people such as Europeans. Some places are mutually exclusive, such as male-female, or employed-unemployed; some are nested, for example, French, Dutch, German versus European; and some are cross-cutting, such as female and student (Turner 1999; Hornsey and Hogg forthcoming). All these different roles and positions a person occupies form his personal identity. At the same time, every place a person occupies is shared with other people. I am not the only professor of social psychology, nor the only Dutch or the only European. I share these identities with other people—a fact that turns them into collective identities. Thus a collective identity is a place shared with other people. This implies that personal identity is always collective identity at the same time. Personal identity is general, referring to a variety of places in society, whereas collective identity is specific, referring to a specific place.

Most of the time collective identities remain latent. Self-categorization theory hypothesizes that depending on contextual circumstances an individual may act as a unique person, that is, display his personal identity or as a member of a specific group, that is, display one of the many collective identities he has (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell 1987; Turner 1999). Contextual factors may bring personal or collective identity to the fore. Obviously, this is often no matter of free choice. Circumstances may force a collective identity into awareness whether people like it or not, as the Yugoslavian and South African histories have illustrated dramatically. But also in less extreme circumstances collective identities can become significant. Take for example the possible effect of an announcement that a waste incinerator is planned next to a neighborhood. Chances are that within very little time the collective identity of the people living in that neighborhood becomes salient.

The basic hypothesis regarding collective identity and movement participation is fairly straightforward: a strong identification with a group makes participation in collective political action on behalf of that group more likely (Huddy 2001; see Stryker, Owen, and White 2000 for a comprehensive treatment of the subject). The available empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports this assumption. Kelly & Breinlinger (1996) found that identification with a labor union and its members made it more likely for workers to participate in industrial action; while gender identification made participation in the women’s
movement more likely. Simon et al. (1998) and Stürmer (2001) observed that identification with other gay people, but especially with other members of the gay movement reinforced involvement in the gay movement. Finally, Klandermans and his colleagues (De Weerd and Klandermans 1999; Klandermans, Sabucedo, and Rodríguez 2002) reported that farmers who identified with other farmers were more likely to be involved in farmer’s protest than those who did not display any identification with other farmers.

**Ideology.** The third motive, wanting to express one’s views refers at the same time to a longstanding theme in the social movement literature and to a recent development. In classic studies of social movements the distinction was made between instrumental and expressive movements or protest (cf. Searles and Williams 1962; Gusfield 1963). In those days, instrumental movements were seen as movements that aimed at some external goal, for example, the implementation of citizenship rights. Participation in expressive movements, on the other hand, was a goal in itself, for example, the expression of anger in response to experienced injustice. Movement scholars felt increasingly uncomfortable with the distinction, because it was thought that most movements had both instrumental and expressive aspects and that the emphasis on the two could change over time. Therefore, the distinction lost its use. Recently, however, the idea that people might participate in movements to express their views has received anew attention. This time from movement scholars who were unhappy with the overly structural approach of resource mobilization and political process theory. These scholars put an emphasis on such aspects as the creative and cultural aspects of social movements, narratives, emotions, and moral indignation (see Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001 and in this volume for an overview). People are angry, develop feelings of moral indignation about some state of affairs or some government decision and they want to make that known. They participate in a social movement not only to enforce political change, but to gain dignity in their lives through struggle and moral expression.

Goodwin et al. argue that emotions are socially constructed, but that “some emotions are more [socially] constructed than others, involving more cognitive processes.” (2001, p. 13). In their view, emotions that are politically relevant are more than other emotions at the social construction end of the scale. For these emotions, cultural and historical factors play an important role in the interpretation of the state of affairs by which they are generated. Emotions, these authors hold, are important in the growth and unfolding of social movement and political protest. Obviously, emotions can be manipulated. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented. They must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional package of attitudes. Also in the ongoing activities of the movements do emotions play an important role (Jasper 1997, 1998). Anger and indignation are emotions that are related to a specific appraisal of the situation. At the same time, people might be puzzled by some aspects of reality and try to understand what is going on. They may look for others with similar experiences and a social movement may provide an environment to exchange experiences, to tell their stories and to express their feelings.

The supply-side of participation

Social movement organizations are more or less successful in satisfying demands for collective political participation and we may assume that movements that are successfully supplying what potential participants demand, gain more support than movements that fail to do so. Movements and movement organizations can be compared in terms of their effectiveness in this regard.
**Instrumentality.** Instrumentality presupposes an effective movement, that is able to enforce some wanted changes or at least to mobilize substantial support. Making an objective assessment of a movement’s impact is not easy (see Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999; Giugni 1998; in this volume), but of course movement organizations will try to convey the image of an effective political force. They can do so by pointing to the impact they have had in the past, or to the powerful allies they have. Of course, they may lack all this, but then, they might be able to show other signs of strength. A movement may command a large constituency as witnessed by turnout on demonstrations, or by membership figures, or large donations. It may comprise strong organizations with strong charismatic leaders who have gained respect, and so on. Instrumentality also implies the provision of selective incentives. The selective incentives of participation that can be made available, may vary considerably between movement organizations. Such variation depends on the resources a movement organization has at its disposal (McCarthy and Zald 1976; Oliver 1980). Surprisingly, little systematic comparison of the characteristics of movements, movement organizations and campaigns in view of the supply side of participation can be found in the literature (but see Klandermans 1993). The political system and the alliance and conflict system movement organizations are embedded in may also show considerable variation that influences the supply-side of movement participation. Indeed, Tilly (1978) coined the terms 'repression' and 'facilitation' to distinguish between political systems that increase or decrease the costs of participation. Repressive political environments may increase the costs of participation considerably: people may lose friends, they may risk their jobs or otherwise jeopardize their sources of income, they may be jailed, and they may even lose their lives.

An important element of the supply-side of participation is the provision of information about the behavior of others. Social networks are of strategic importance in this respect, because it is through these networks that people are informed about the behavior or intentions of others (Oegema and Klandermans 1994; Kim and Bearman 1997; Chwe 1999; Passy 2001). As discussed the importance of such information differs depending of the type of participation. Building on the argument that individuals hold different thresholds, Rule (1988, 1989) argued that seeing that increasing numbers take part in a collective action in itself motivates growing numbers of people to join because their individual thresholds to participation are passed. In his paper on the Chinese student movement of 1989 Zhao (1998) gives a striking illustration of this mechanism. He describes how the ecological circumstance that most students in Beijing live in the same part of town made the success of the movement in terms of mobilization literary visible in the streets in front of the dormitories.

**Identity.** Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one’s group. This is the most attractive if people identify strongly with their group. The more farmers identify with other farmers the more prepared they are to take part in farmers’ protest (De Weerd and Klandermans 1999; Klandermans et al. 2002). The more women identify with other women the more they are prepared to take part in the women’s movement (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996); and the more gay people identify with other gay people the more they are prepared to take part if the gay movement (Simon et al. 1999; Stürmer 2000). Interestingly, all these studies show that identification with the more exclusive group of movement participants is far more influential than identification with the more inclusive category. Indeed, in addition to the opportunity to act on behalf of the group, collective political action participation offers further constituents of identification: the movement’s cause; the people in the movement, the movement organization, or the group one is participating in; the leader of the movement. Not all these sources of identification are always equally appealing. Movement leaders can be more or less charismatic or the people in the movement or in someone’s group can be more or less attractive. Moreover, movements and movement organizations may be, and in fact often are, controversial. Hence, becoming a participant in a movement organization does not mean
taking a respected position upon oneself. Within the movement's framework, this is, of course, completely different. There the militant does have the status society is denying him. And, of course, for an activist ingroup-outgroup dynamics may turn the movement organization or group into a far more attractive group than any other group 'out there' that is opposing the movement. Indeed, it is not uncommon for militants to refer to the movement organization as a second family, a substitute for the social and associative life society was no longer offering them (Tristan 1987; Orfali 1990). Movement organizations not only supply sources of identification, they also offer all kinds of opportunities to enjoy and celebrate the collective identity: marches, rituals, songs, meetings, signs, symbols and common codes (see Stryker et al. 2000 for an overview).

A complicating matter when it comes to the supply-side of participation is the fact that people have multiple identities while movements emphasize a collective identity, and therefore by definition refer to a single place in society. This may imply competing loyalties as Oegema and Klandermans (1994) demonstrated with regard to the Dutch peace movement. The movement’s campaign against cruise missiles brought many a citizen, who sympathized with the movement but was affiliated the Christian Democratic Party that in regard to cruise missiles stood opposite the movement, under cross-pressure. Movement organizations are more or less successful in coping with multiple identities. Sharon Kurtz (2002) describes how clerical workers of Columbia University struggled but succeeded to reconcile gender, ethnic, and class identities. Karen Beckwith (1998), on the other hand, explains how women in the Pittston Coal Strike were denied the possibility to act on their gender identity. Very little systematic attention has been given in the social movement literature to the issue of multiple identity, yet it is to be assumed that every movement somehow must deal with the problem and depending on how this is accomplished is more or less attractive to various constituencies. Gerhards and Rucht (1992), for example, describe how the organizers of two demonstrations in Berlin went to great length to make it possible for various constituencies to identify with goals of the demonstration. Similar observations can be found in the first studies on the anti-globalization movement (Smith 2001; Levi and Murphy 2002).

There is evidence that identity processes have both an indirect and a direct effect on protest participation (Sturmer 2000). Indirect in that collective identity influences instrumental reasoning such that it makes it less attractive to take a free ride. Hirsch’s (1990) study of the Columbia divestment protest is a good example of how solidarity with the group as it developed at the doorsteps of the administration of Columbia University make it difficult for participants to drop out. Indeed, collective identity appears to be a way to overcome the social dilemma built into the instrumental route to movement participation (see also Klandermans 2000). High levels of group identification increase the costs of defection and the benefits of cooperation. In other words, collective identity impacts on the instrumental pathway to protest participation. Direct because collective identity creates a shortcut to participation. People participate not so much because of the outcomes associated with participation but because they identify with the other participants.

Ideology. Social movements play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values (Eyerman and Jamison (1992). Rochon (1998) makes the distinction between ‘critical communities’ where new ideas and values are developed and ‘social movements’ that are interested in winning social and political acceptance for those ideas and values. ‘In the hands of movement leaders, the ideas of critical communities become ideological frames’ (p. 31), so Rochon, who continues to argue that social movements are not simply extensions of critical communities. After all, not all ideas developed in critical communities are equally suited to motivate collective action. Social movement organizations, then, are carriers of meaning. Through processes such as consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1984), framing (Snow et al. 1986), or dialogue (Steinberg 1999) they seek to disseminate their definition of the situation
to the public at large. Gerhards and Rucht’s study (1992) of flyers produced by the various groups and organizations involved in the protests against the IMF and the World Bank in Berlin is an excellent example in this respect. These authors show how links are constructed between the ideological frame of the organizers of the demonstration and those of the participating organizations in order to create a shared definition of the situation. Such definitions of the situation have been labelled ‘collective action frames’ (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997). Collective action frames can be defined in terms of injustice—that is, some definition of what’s wrong in the world; identity—that is, some definition of who is affected and who is responsible; and agency—that is some beliefs about the possibilities to change society. We may assume that people who join a movement come to share some part of the movement’s action frame and that in the process of sharing meaning is given to their world.

Social movements do not invent ideas from scratch, they build on an ideological heritage as they relate their claims to broader themes and values in society. In so doing they relate to societal debates that have a history of its own and that history is usually much longer than that of the movement itself. Gamson (1992), for example, refers to the ‘themes’ and ‘counterthemes’ that in his view exist in every society. One such pair of a theme and countertheme he mentions, is ‘self-reliance’ vs. ‘mutuality,’ that is the belief that individuals must take care of themselves vs. the belief that society is responsible for its less fortunate members. In a study of the protests about disability payment in the Netherlands we demonstrated how in the Netherlands these two beliefs became the icons that galvanized the debates (Klandermans and Goslinga 1996). While ‘self-reliance’ became the theme of those favouring restrictions in disability payment, ‘mutuality’ was the theme of those who defended the existing system. Another example is what Tarrow (1998) calls ‘rights frames’: human rights, civil rights, women's rights, animal rights, and so on. In other words, collective action frames that relate a movement’s aims to some fundamental rights frame. For decades Marxism has been such an ideological heritage from the past movements identified with, positively by embracing it or negatively by distancing themselves from it. In a similar vein, fascism and nazism form the ideological heritage rightwing extremism must comes to terms with either by identifying with it or by keeping it at a distance. Some of those ideas from the past are more useful than others are. For example, Kitschelt (1995) has argued that parties of the new radical right that identify too much with Nazism or fascism are doomed to be unsuccessful (see also Ignazi and Ysmal 1992)

It is not just the cognitive component of ideology that social movements are the conduits of. Emotions, that is the affective component of ideology are equally important. After all, people are angry, morally outraged and movement organizations provide the opportunity to express and communicate those feelings. Scholarly attention for the role of emotions in the realm of movement participation is only in its infancy. In an edited volume Goodwin et al. (2001) have brought work on the subject together. As a chapter by the same authors in this volume is devoted to the subject of emotion, passion, and participation, I will be brief. Obviously, movements differ in regard to how they deal with emotions, feelings, or passion both in terms of the passion that spurs participation and in terms of how they deal with emotion and affection inside the movement. The better they do the more committed to the movement people will become, but if they fail this may become a reason for a movement to collapse as Goodwin’s (1997) study of the Huk-rebellion illustrates. The failure of that rebellious movement to deal with affective and sexual relations within the movement and between movement participants and outsiders eventually undermined the movement.
Mobilization

When an individual participates in collective political action staged by a social movement organization this is the result of a sometimes lengthy process of mobilization. Successful mobilization gradually brings demand and supply together. If substantial proportions of the population are aggrieved, and if movement organizations stage collective action to voice those grievances a massive protest movement may develop. Mobilization is a complicated process that can be broken down into several, conceptually distinct steps. At the time, I proposed to break the process of mobilization down into consensus and action mobilization (Klandermans 1984). Consensus mobilization refers to dissemination of the views of the movement organization and action mobilization refers to the transformation of those who adopted the view of the movement into participants. Thus defined action mobilization is constrained by the results of consensus mobilization, as I demonstrated in my own work (1997). Indeed, action mobilization attempts tend to concentrate on people with an attitudinal disposition to participate, rightly so as Marwell and Oliver’s (1993) computer simulation suggest. An interesting recent illustration of the strategic importance of consensus mobilization can be found in Walgrave and Manssens’ (2000) study of the ‘White Marsh’ in Brussels in response to the government’s failure to deal with the Dutroux kidnappings and killings. Moral outrage brought hundreds of thousand people in the streets of Brussels. The authors demonstrate that the mass media played a crucial role in mobilizing consensus on the issue. Consensus mobilization has been elaborated much further by Snow and Benford and their colleagues in their frame alignment approach to mobilization (Snow in this volume; Benford 1997 for a critical review).

In my own work I focussed on the process of action mobilization which I broke further down into four separate steps (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Each step brings the supply and demand of collective political action closer together until an individual eventually takes the final step to participate in an instance of collective political action. As action mobilization builds on the results of consensus mobilization the first step accounts for that results. It distinguishes the general public into people who sympathize with the cause and people who don’t. The more successful consensus mobilization has been, the larger the pool of sympathizers a mobilizing movement organization can draw from. A large pool of sympathizers is of strategic importance, because for a variety of reasons many a sympathizer never turns into a participant. The second step is equally obvious as crucial, it divides the sympathizers into those who have been target of mobilization attempts and those who haven’t. In addition to the question of whether people have been targeted we can distinguish qualitative and quantitative differences in targeting. People can be targeted more or less frequent and in more or less insistent ways. The third step concerns the social psychological core of the process. It divides the sympathizers who have been targeted into those who are motivated to participate in the specific activity and those who aren’t. Finally, the fourth step differentiates the people who are motivated into those who end up participating and those who don’t (Figure 1).

In our research on the mobilization campaign for a peace demonstration (Klandermans and Oegema 1987) we found that three quarters of the population of a small community south of Amsterdam felt sympathy for the movement’s cause. Of these sympathizers three quarters were somehow targeted by mobilization attempts. Of those targeted one sixth was motivated
to participate in the demonstration. And finally, of those motivated one third end up participating. The net result of these different steps is some (usually small) proportion of the general public that participates in collective action.1 With each step smaller or larger numbers drop out. The smaller the number of dropouts the better the fit between demand and supply. This can be illustrated with the following queries related to the subsequent steps: 1. Does the cause of the movement appeal to concerns of individual citizens? 2. Do the movement’s networks link to the individuals’ networks? 3. Is the activity the movement is mobilizing for appealing to individual citizens? 4. Is the movement able to eliminate any remaining barrier for individual citizens?

In a motivational model of movement participation (Klandermans 1984, 1997) I have tried to account for the third step. The model takes as its point of departure that movement goals are public goods. It belongs to the expectancy-value family and links the supply of collective political action as perceived by the individual to his or her demands. In doing so it combines insights from rational choice theory with those from collective action theory. The model makes a distinction between collective and selective incentives. Put simply, it poses that people are motivated by the possibility to support the production of an attractive public good—such as clean air, peace or equal rights (collective incentives) to be achieved by participation in attractive action means—for example, a rally where their favourite music group performs (selective incentives). Collective incentives are further broken down into the value of the public good and the expectation that it will be produced. A key element of that expectation are expectations about the behaviour of others. This is what makes collective behaviour different from individual behaviour. The theory supposes an optimum: too many expected participants makes it unnecessary for the individual to participate; too few expected participants makes it useless for the individual to participate. Perceived selective incentives add to the explanation, especially so-called social incentives which in Klandermans’ model consists of the expected reaction of significant others if the individual decides to participate. Since its publication the model has found convincing empirical support (Brïet, Klandermans and Kroon 1987; Klandermans 1984; Klandermans 1993; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Kelly and Breinlinger 1996; Simon et al. 1998; Stürmer 2000).

I am not aware of much research into the last step. Obviously, we may assume that at this stage barriers interact with strength of motivation. The stronger someone’s motivation, the more likely that she will overcome the last barriers. Our own research suggests that friendship networks play a crucial role in this respect. It are your friends that keep you to your promises (Oegema and Klandermans 1994). The second step is about networks. Networks to a large extent determine whether someone becomes target of mobilization attempts. They are the conduits of all kind of information that is processed during mobilization (Ohlemacher 1992; Passy 2001; Chwe 1999). There exists an extensive literature on the role of networks in movement mobilization (see Kitts 2000; and Diani in this volume for overviews).

**The dynamics of disengagement**

The dynamics of participation in social movements have an obvious counterpart, namely, the dynamics of disengagement. Why do people defect the movement they have worked for so very hard? Surprisingly little attention has been given to that question. Compared to the

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1 A small proportion does not necessarily mean a negligible event. For example, although only 4 % of the population participated in the peace demonstration, this mounted nevertheless into a demonstration with 500.000 participants—the largest demonstration the country had ever seen.
abundant literature on why people join movements, literature on why they exit is almost nonexistent. Elsewhere, I have discussed extensively the social psychological dynamics of disengagement (Klandermans 2003). Guiding principle of that discussion was the following simple model (Figure 2).

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**Figure 2**
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Insufficient gratification in combination with declining commitment produces a growing intention to leave. Eventually, some critical event tips the balance and makes the person quit. Obviously, the event itself only triggers the final step. Against that background its impact may be overestimated. After all, it were the decline in gratification and commitment that causes defection, the critical event only precipitated matters.

**Insufficient gratification.** In the previous sections I distinguished three fundamental motives to participate. On each of these motives a movement may fall short. Most likely it is for movements to fall short in terms of instrumentality. Although it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of social movements, it is obvious that many a movement goal is never reached. Opp (19[lah]a) has argued that indeed people are very well aware of the fact that movement goals are not always easy to achieve, but that they reason that nothing happens in any event if nobody participates. Yet, sooner or later some success must be achieved for the instrumentality motive to continue to fuel participation (Schwartz 1976). In addition to not being achieved, movement goals may loose their attraction to people. They may loose their urgency and end lower at the societal agenda. Finally, the individual costs or risks of participation may be too high compared to the attraction of the movement’s goals. Repression adds to the costs and might make participation too costly for people (Tilly 1978).

Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one’s group. This is the most attractive if people identify strongly with their group. But the composition of a movement may change and as a consequence people may feel less akin to the others in the movement (Whittier 1997; Klandermans 1994). Indeed, I showed how activists from other movements flocked in increasing numbers into the Dutch peace movement, and thus estranged the original activist who had a church background. Schisms are another reason why movements fail to satisfy identity motives. Schisms are not uncommon in the social movement domain (Gamson 1975). Sani and Reicher (1998) demonstrate that schisms result from fights over the core identity of a movement and that people who leave no longer feel that they can identify with the movement. Finally, people occupy a variety of positions in society. Each position is shared with other people and therefore comes with a (most of the time) latent collective identity. A change in context may make the one collective identity more and the others less salient and, therefore identification with a movement may wither. For example, in our study of farmers’ protest in the Netherlands and Spain, we observed that in Spain during a campaign for local and provincial elections the identification with farmers declined (Klandermans et al. 2001).

Social movements provide the opportunity to express one’s views and feelings. This is not to say that they are always equally successful in that regard. Obviously, there is not always full synchrony between a movement’s ideology and a person’s beliefs. Indeed, many a movement organization ends in fights between ideological factions and schisms and defection as a consequence (Gamson 1975). Movements also differ in regard to how they deal with emotions, feelings, or passion both in terms of the passion that spurs participation and in terms of how they deal with emotion and affection inside the movement.
Declining commitment. The concept of commitment roots in the fields of organizational psychology and the social psychology of union participation, where a lively debate on commitment has taken place over the last two decades (Goslinga 2002). Movement commitment does not last by itself. It must be maintained via interaction with the movement and any measure that makes that interaction less gratifying helps to undermine commitment. Downton and Wehr (1991, 1997) discuss mechanisms of social bonding which movements apply to maintain commitment. Leadership, ideology, organization, rituals, and social relations which make up a friendship network each contribute to sustaining commitment and the most effective is, of course, a combination of all five. These authors refer to the ‘common devotion’ that results from shared leadership; to group pressure as the primary means of maintaining a social movement's ideology; to ‘taking on a role within the organization itself’ as a way of increasing people's investment in the organization; to rituals as patterns of behavior that are repeated over time to strengthen core beliefs of the movement; and to circles of friends that strengthen and maintain individual commitment by putting an individual's beliefs and behavior under greater scrutiny and social control.

Although not all of them are equally well researched, each of these five mechanisms are known from the literature on union and movement participation as factors which foster people's attachment to movements. For example, it is known from research on union participation that involving members in decision-making processes increases commitment to a union (Klandermans 1986; 1992). For such different groups as the lesbian movement groups (Taylor and Whittier 1995) and a group called Victims of Child Abuse Laws (Fine 1995) it was demonstrated how rituals strengthen the membership's bond to the movement. Unions and other movement organizations have developed all kind of services for their members to make membership more attractive. Selective incentives may seldom be sufficient reasons to participate in a movement, but they do increase commitment.

The role of precipitating events. When gratification falls short and commitment declines an intention to leave develops. Yet, this intention to leave does not necessarily turns into defection. Many participants maintain a marginal level of participation for extended periods until some event makes them quit. For example, Goslinga (2002) calculated that a stable 25 percent of the membership of Dutch labour unions considered leaving. As the event is the immediate cause of disengagement it draws disproportionate attention as explanation of exit behavior, but note that the event only has this impact in the context of an already present readiness to leave. Such critical events can have many different appearances. When some decades ago Dutch labour unions changed to a different system of dues collection and members had to sign to agree with the new system quite a few members choose not to sign. Changing address may be seized as an opportunity to leave the movement simply by not renewing contacts in the new place of residence. More substantial reasons might be a conflict with others in the organization, disappointing experiences in the movement, a failed collective action, and so on. Such events function as the last drop that makes the cup run over.

Conclusions

Participation in a social movement is not just a matter of people who are pushed to act by some internal psychological state (the demand-side of participation), nor is it a matter of movement organizations pulling people into action (the supply-side of participation). Demand, supply, and mobilization account for instances of participation. The reason why often no collective action takes place despite widespread discontent, is that there is no viable movement organization to stage any action. At the same time, when present a movement organization does not get very far if there are no people who are concerned about the issues
the organization tries to address. Finally, without effective mobilization campaigns supply and demand may never meet. Understanding the supply side of participation involves theories from sociology and political sciences about the development and dynamics of social movements; understanding the demand side, requires models from social and political psychology about grievance formation, the formation of identity, and social cognition and emotion. Like in economics there is an intriguing interplay of demand and supply. Sometimes an attractive and well timed action attracts an enormous turnout, that is to say, the supply reinforces the demand. Sometimes massive discontent generates a strong movement, demand triggers supply. But of course, most of the time demand and supply reinforce each other. Mobilization is the process that makes the two meet. Theories of persuasion and network analysis are relevant in this realm.

Different motives can be into play in the exchange between a movement and its participants. Instrumentality, identity, and ideology have been proposed as possible motives that contribute to the individual’s motivation to participate. I suggested that the three can compensate one another. Participation may not be immediately effective in bringing about changes. Participants understand that and will not expect government to give in at the first sign of contention. On the other hand, it may suffice for many a participant to have the opportunity to meet with other like-minded people and to express his opinion. Collective political action is not only about effectiveness but also about passionate politics. This is not to say that effectiveness is likely to become irrelevant altogether. Obviously, sooner or later something should change. If nothing ever happens a movement of change will collapse, fade, or turn into a social club or self-help organization.
Figure 1 Four steps toward participation
Figure 2 The dynamics of disengagement